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ABSTRACT 
 
Political competition plays a crucial role in the democratic cycle, be it as a 
possible mainspring of political participation or as the essential element 
of democratic accountability and responsiveness. Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that many scholars focus on the impact and meaning of political 
competition. Unfortunately, such is very often misspecified as a unidi-
mensional concept. At least since Stefano Bartolini's seminal paper Collu-
sion, Competition and Democracy (1999, 2000), however, there should 
be no doubt that political competition is a multidimensional issue that 
should be treated accordingly. Bartolini identifies four independent di-
mensions of political competition: The conditions of entry to the elec-
toral contest ('contestability'), the elasticity of the voters' demand 
('availability'), the distinctiveness of the political offer ('decidability'), and 
the incumbents' safety of tenure ('vulnerability').  
In our paper we suggest an instrument that relies on this Bartolinian no-
tion of political competition and allows us to appropriately measure the 
four dimensions. By applying this concept to 30 established democracies, 
we are able to describe the interdependence of the four dimensions and 
use them to create a typology of different models of competition.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Political competition is an important, if not the most critical determinant of democ-
racy. Free, fair, and competitive elections are seen the minimal precondition in order 
for a country to be a democracy (e.g., Dahl, 1971; Przeworski et al., 2000; Sartori, 
1987; Strom, 1992). Democratic theory considers political competition in at least two 
different ways: On one hand, it is viewed as the mechanism that ensures respon-
siveness (Powell, 2004) and accountability (O’Donnell, 1994). On the other hand, it is 
seen as the pivotal characteristic of control by the people. In representative democ-
racies, vertical control is exercised by means of elections (Manin et al., 1999). How-
ever, effective elections must be competitive - only competition ensures a real 
choice and induces the political elite to act responsively. Only when there are several 
parties that are forced to compete for political power in elections, thus, only when 
there is a chance to win and lose elections, parties have to deliver on their promises.  
Competition plays a decisive role in political theory as well as in the empirical com-
parative politics literature; there is empirical evidence for the positive impact of 
competition on different political and social outcomes, such as better representation 
(Powell, 2000), improved economic performance (Przeworski & Limongi, 1993), less 
corruption (Binzer, Hobolt, & Klemmensen, 2008; Coppedge, 1993), a higher quality 
of governance (Cleary, 2007), or even stability in new democracies (Wright, 2008). 
Furthermore, competition seems to have a positive effect on voter turnout (Franklin, 
2004; Jackman, 1987; Sandell & Pacheco, 2008; for an overview of different studies 
using competition as an explanatory variable, see Bischoff, 2006).  
However, even if the concept of competition is widely used, it is understood and 
measured differently and, thus, seems to be very elusive (Bischoff, 2006). In demo-
cratic theory, competition often stands for the electoral process as a whole. The 
meaning of ‘competition’ in the different empirical contributions heavily depends on 
the research question: While voter turnout seems to be affected by the closeness of 
the race, higher representation is more probable in open systems and the degree of 
corruption depends on the clarity of responsibility (i.e., the possibility of making spe-
cific parties accountable). Whether or not parties compete also depends on the vola-
tility of the electorate. However, even if these four concepts all measure some sort 
of competition, they have very different meanings.  
In his groundbreaking contribution, Bartolini (1999, 2000) clarified the elusive con-
cept of competition. He argued that competition is only one out of four types of so-
cial interaction and must be distinguished from conflict, negotiation, and coopera-
tion. Thus, competition can be neither a condition for democracy nor can democracy 
be a product of competition. Rather, democracy is a condition for competition. Fur-
thermore, there are different dimensions of competition: contestability, availability, 
decidability, and vulnerability. According to Bartolini (2000), these dimensions are 
mutually interconnected. There are various relationships between these dimensions 
and different countries give different weight to the different dimensions.  
In this contribution, we attempt to develop measures for the different dimensions 
that Bartolini theoretically designs. More precisely, for each of the four parts of 
competition, we deduce and use several variables and combine them to a measure 
for the dimension. With these four measures at hand, we test Bartolini’s assumption 
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of their mutual interconnectedness. Furthermore, we present a typology of different 
empirical forms of competition. Our results imply that competition is indeed a multi-
dimensional concept and should be treated and used as such.  
In the following section, we discuss the contribution of Bartolini (1999, 2000) and 
present the four dimensions of competition. In section 3, we suggest measures for 
each of these dimensions. Based on a sample of 30 democratic countries, we use 
these measures in the next section to test several hypotheses concerning the mutual 
connections between the dimensions and to develop a typology of different models 
of competition. Section 5 concludes.     
BARTOLINI ’S 4  DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION  
In his influential contribution on the discussion of competition (1999, 2000), Bartolini 
argues in a twofold way that the concept of competition usually used in theoretical 
and empirical political science is “vague and ambiguous” (1999, p. 436). First, com-
petition must be distinguished from other types of social interaction of different au-
tonomous actors. Second, the relationship of competition and democracy must be 
redefined. Competition is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for democracy 
and democracy is not a by-product of competition. Furthermore, the conceptualiza-
tion of competition depends on the model of democracy.  
The first argument bases itself on the assumption that competition is only one out of 
four types of social interaction among mutually dependent actors. Competition must 
be distinguished from conflict, negotiation, and cooperation. Competition is similar 
to conflict in terms of the principle of action and of the goals. In both of these social 
interaction types, individuals refuse to subordinate their own interests to a common 
or global interest – as they do in negotiations and cooperational arrangements. 
However, while in conflict interactions, the goals of the actors are different and they 
try to inflict damages on each other. In competitive relations, the goals of actors are 
similar (i.e., obtaining power) and the competitors do not use strength against each 
other. Contrary to cooperation, the perceptions of the interest in competitive rela-
tionships are not complementary, but independent actors do not share and ex-
change means and information, nor do they advance promises or threats as done in 
negotiations. The most important distinctive feature of competition – compared to 
the other three types of interaction – is the unintended consequences imposed on 
third parties: Competition transforms individually driven interests into socially desir-
able ends. It is this idea of the invisible hand that makes competition so valuable for 
the idea of democracy.   
However, and this is Bartolini’s second argument, the idea of this invisible hand pro-
ducing the by-product called democracy does not take into consideration the distinct 
features of competition compared with the three other types of relationship. To ful-
fill socially desirable ends, competitive relations need a framework of rules, norms, 
and regulations that can only be installed through cooperation and negotiation. 
Thus, democracy is a necessary condition of competition and not vice versa. Fur-
thermore, Bartolini argues that competition should not be seen as a defining feature 
of democracy, either. Of course, and foremost put forward by economic theories of 
democracy based on Schumpeter (1950) and Downs (1957), to be democratic, elec-
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tions must be free, fair, and competitive. However, in this case, ‘competitive’ only 
means contestable; that is, the electoral market must be open to everyone who 
wants to participate. Contestability helps to make the government accountable. The 
regular renewal of the mandate to rule is required for an accountability theory of 
democracy. Thus, only contestability can be seen at the same time as a necessary 
condition for competition and as a defining characteristic of democracy. However, 
contestability is not the same as competition. When competition should lead to so-
cially desired ends, contestability alone is not sufficient. In other words, a democracy 
must not only embrace accountability but also responsiveness (i.e., the obligation for 
the government to do what citizens want) (Powell, 2004). Bartolini argues that there 
are three further necessary conditions of competition in order to ensure responsibil-
ity: vulnerability, availability, and decidability.  
The probability that politicians indeed do what the citizens want is higher when they 
cannot be sure that they are going to be re-elected. Thus, they must be electorally 
vulnerable. However, electoral vulnerability depends on the willingness of the voters 
to effectively reward and punish incumbents (i.e., to alter their electoral choices). 
Bartolini calls the overall predisposition for the modification of electoral preferences 
electoral availability. Finally, voters must be motivated to effectively switch their 
party choices. This is only possible when there are different and clearly distinguisha-
ble offers by different parties, such as when the offer is decidable. 
The main part of Bartolini’s contribution (1999, 2000) is devoted to the discussion of 
the four dimensions of competition, as they are understood as a means for demo-
cratic accountability and responsiveness. We provide a brief overview of the main 
arguments of this discussion to have a sound position to deduce possible measures 
for these four dimensions of political competition. We thereby follow Bartolini’s 
(1999, 2000) structure.  
THE  CON TE S T AB I LI T Y  O F ELEC T IO NS  
Contestability ensures that – in principle – everybody can participate in the electoral 
contest. Bartolini argues that there are three distinct systemic opportunities or bar-
riers that structure the behavior of new and old claimants. First, there are ex ante 
barriers, such as rules and requirements for entering the electoral race. The height 
of such entry barriers can vary and discriminate against new potential competitors 
to different degrees. Second, even if the electoral market is open, there can be rules 
that prevent competitors from winning seats. Thresholds or gerrymandering can di-
minish the fairness of representation. Third, there can be rules that provide an ad-
vantage to incumbents over new parties. Access to media or public money can be 
easier for parties within the electoral market than for new competitors.  
Bartolini discusses two important features of contestability. First, he links the discus-
sion on contestability with his previously discussed argument that competition is on-
ly one of different types of social interaction. It is important to note that the differ-
ent barriers that can be installed to discriminate new competitors can be the result 
of collusive behavior of incumbents and, thus, a lack of competition. Because every 
barrier offers an opportunity for collusion and results in a potential threat for re-
sponsiveness, high contestability would mean no barriers at all. However, and se-
cond, barriers can also help to avoid political chaos. The unlimited openness of the 
electoral race can lead to an excessive fragmentation of the offer. Too many suppli-
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ers would blur the distinctiveness of the offer. Therefore, Bartolini argues that the 
metaphor of electoral competition as an open market cannot be upheld. Even if 
there was an economic theory that defines the optimal number of actors for best 
competition, it would not work for electoral competition because of the monopolis-
tic nature of legislation and due to the fact that barriers of entry are not set by the 
process of competition itself but outside and independent of this process. Contesta-
bility thus should be considered a first dimension of electoral competition that struc-
tures the opportunities for new and old potential claimants. The variation of these 
opportunities defines the openness of the electoral system as well as the degree of 
collusion among incumbents.  
THE  ELEC T OR AL  AVAI L AB I L IT Y  
To be responsive, incumbents must anticipate voter reactions. However, the more 
stable these voter reactions, the smaller the potential threat for incumbents. Hence, 
incumbents are less required to adopt their actions to the citizens’ wants. Thus, 
what Bartolini calls “the demand side” is crucial for competition: In systems in which 
voters are not willing to change their party preferences, such as where voter elastici-
ty is low, it makes little sense for parties to compete.  
Of course, not only the willingness to switch party preferences but also the willing-
ness to participate in elections plays an important role for competition. In a theoret-
ically ideal competition, all individuals who are eligible to vote go to the polls. They 
vote for the party they like most or the politician from whom they expect the highest 
payoff. However, the real world differs from this ideal in several points.  
First, electoral participation is far from being complete. In countries with low turn-
out, it becomes more and more important for parties to mobilize voters. In terms of 
competition, the non-voters are important as mobilizable potential voters.
3
  
Second, we know from electoral research that voters still have strong psychological 
identifications. Of course, in the past 50 years, there is dealignment from party affili-
ation (Dalton et al., 1984). However, there are still large parts of the electorate that 
are not available because they do not switch their party preference because of cul-
tural bonds, their membership in specific organizations, and the like.  
Third, as for the voters that indeed go to the polls and that do not have stable identi-
fications with a given party, the question is on what ground they make their party 
decision. Economic theory distinguishes prospective and retrospective voting. Barto-
lini argues that, in reality, both choice strategies are used. However, what seems 
more important is the sensitivity of a potential vote switcher. An available voter 
normally is not informed about programs or performances of a party, but he must be 
sensitive to such information. Such sensitivity is higher in countries that have low 
segmentation, a low degree of political organization, and a lively public sphere. 
When there are important cleavages due to cultural heterogeneity, when the elec-
torate is encapsulated in political organizations, and when there is only low social 
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 Switzerland can serve an illustrative case. The incommensurable success, at least for Switzer-
land, of the Swiss Peoples’ Party is mostly due to its capacity to mobilize its potential (Kriesi et 
al., 2005).  
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capital in a country, not only is the probability of a high amount of vote-switchers 
low, but also the sensitivity of such voters.   
THE  DEC I D AB I LI T Y  OF  T HE OFFER  
The discussion on sensitivity opens the floor for the next dimension of competition: 
the configuration of the offer. Parties offer programs, issues, and ideologies to the 
voters trying to convince them. Or, more precisely: trying to mobilize their partisans, 
trying to convince and mobilize non-voters and trying to get the potential switch 
voters on their sides. However, to be successful, a party must make as clear and visi-
ble as possible its position, which must be different from the position of other par-
ties. Decidability – as Bartolini calls the third dimension of competition – thus de-
pends on issue differentiation and the visibility and clarity of this difference.  
Again, Bartolini show that economic models are not apt to explain competition. First, 
in a two-party system, perfect competition would be the situation of two nearly 
similar parties that compete for the one median voter. However, this situation 
comes closer to collusion than competition. Second, economic theories are based on 
the assumption that voters’ preferences are stable and exogenous to the process of 
party competition. However, if this would be real, parties would have no incentive to 
adapt their programs and hence, there would be no possibility for responsiveness. 
Bartolini therefore argues that electoral preferences are influenced by party compe-
tition: “Party competition becomes the process through which parties and the elite 
try to shape and modify to their advantage the structure of the electoral prefer-
ences” (Bartolini, 2000, p. 37).   
To really shape the preferences, a party’s offer must fulfill several conditions. First, it 
must be allowed to make an offer; second, its content must be clear and different 
from other offers; and third, it must be clear that the offer comes from the party in 
question. Bartolini discusses these three points in detail. 
Competition bears a danger for democracy. A stable democracy depends on a bal-
ance between competition and cooperation, conflict, and negotiation. Other than in 
economic competition, it is the competitors themselves, such as the political elite 
that decides who is allowed to compete and who is not. An interesting case with this 
respect is the idea of consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1977; 1999). Because of le-
gitimacy cleavages, the elite define areas of interaction in which competition must 
not take place.
4
 This point shows quite nicely one of Bartolini’s main arguments, 
namely that political competition is based on fundamental collusive preconditions.  
However, the question is whether such collusion is necessary for the stability of de-
mocracy or whether collusive behavior of incumbents serves as important barrier for 
competition. This is the case for coalition-making. Because in political competition, 
there normally is only room for a few competitors and cartelization practices are ra-
tional for them. However, coalition-making blurs policy positions and ideologies of 
parties. Because competition processes are not isolated from party interactions in 
the parliamentary process, collusion is more probable in systems with significant op-
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 Again, we can use Switzerland as an illustrative case. Unlike Belgium, in Switzerland there are 
no parties that organize the language cleavage. Even if there are significant preference-
differences in the various language regions, there are no national parties that fight for lan-
guage issues.  
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portunities and incentives for party interactions. It becomes clear that there is only 
one case where such collusion does not take place: a two party system.  
Collusion also can take place concerning salient issues. Parties can try to avoid taking 
a clear position on important issues. However, when party differentials are muted in 
key domains, decidability decreases. In political systems that enforce parties to take 
clear positions on salient issues and in systems that circumvent the removal of im-
portant issues from public debate, the decidability of the offer is higher. However, in 
systems where political agendas can be narrowed by collusive behavior of the com-
petitors, public live becomes trivial (Bartolini, 2000, p. 50).  
The mutually interdependence of the dimensions of competition can be shown by a 
further problem of decidability. As is the case with contestability, there can be com-
petition avoidance by a restriction of the means and resources for electoral competi-
tion, such as by unequal access to media.  
In conclusion, decidability depends on the height of the obstacles for political carteli-
zation and collusion. It is foremost an institutional and even constitutional question 
whether competition is decidable or not (i.e., whether incumbents must take a clear 
and differentiated position that is visible to the voters). The visibility thus depends 
on the clarity of governmental responsibility (Powell & Whitten, 1993) that is also 
conditioned by the size of government. 
THE  ELEC T OR AL  VU L NE RABI L IT Y  OF  INC UMBE N TS  
The most often-used understanding of competition in electoral research is that of 
vulnerability, which is frequently termed as the closeness of the race. For instance, 
in participation research, it is argued that the probability that an electoral race will 
be close enhances an individual’s willingness to indeed go to the polls because the 
chance that this voter’s choice can influence the final outcome of the elections in-
creases. There is a second psychological effect of close races at the party level. The 
more uncertain an electoral outcome, the bigger the probability that incumbents will 
lose and claimants will win. Thus, competition as well as responsiveness rises.  
The problem with vulnerability is that it rests on past events and present feelings. 
The closeness of the race normally shows up only after a given election. Thus, the re-
sult of the past election must be taken into consideration. However, the feeling of a 
lack of safety for incumbents must also be nourished by actual experience. Thus, 
closeness of electoral outcome is only one dimension of vulnerability. There are also 
system properties that must be taken into consideration. First, there must be a clear 
distinction between government and opposition and, second, the electoral availabil-
ity along this distinction must be large enough to approach the majority of the in-
cumbent party (or parties).  
MEASURING THE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF 
COMPETITION  
In what follows, we discuss measures for each of the four dimensions. In other 
words, we look for the “empirical conditions which may push parties to compete one 
against the other for voters’ preferences” (Bartolini, 2000, p. 33). Our empirical anal-
ysis is based upon different indicators on the electoral and political systems in 30 es-
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tablished democracies between 1995 and 2005. For this contribution, we decided to 
take the mean values of these indicators, arguing that we are interested in – so to 
speak – the culture of competition within a given country. Of course, one can argue 
that the degree of competition depends on a given situation, a specific campaign, or 
a given initial position of an electoral campaign. However, while this could be true 
for vulnerability, it is – depending on the age of a given party system - less true for 
availability and for decidability and foremost for contestability. The latter two di-
mensions also are determined by relatively stable constitutional settings. The 30 
countries in our sample can be seen as relatively old and stable democracies.
5
 Of 
course, with the indicators discussed in the following, it is also possible to analyze 
cases of “situational competitiveness” (Strom, 1992).   
To measure the four dimensions, we decided to choose indicators that cover the 
aforementioned theoretical arguments that can be combined into a single score. As 
we are dealing with dimensions of political competition, factor analysis methods are 
good tools to use. For each dimension we are using a confirmatory factor analysis 
that is commonly used to test how well a specific set of selected indicators repre-
sents a theoretically deduced construct.
6
 We then use the resulting factor scores as 
values for the several dimensions of competition. The factor scores are easy to in-
terpret. Factor scores above 0 indicate a value above average and factor scores be-
low 0 indicate values below average.  
ME AS URI N G CO NT ES T ABI L IT Y  
In his article, Bartolini defines three distinct and systemic barriers that regulate the 
openness or, rather, the contestability of an electoral system: ex ante entry condi-
tions, requirements to political return, and biases in quasi-integrated systems. All of 
these barriers shape the contestability of the political race and should, consequently, 
be accounted for in measuring this dimension. 
EX -AN T E  EN T R Y  CO N D I T I O N S  
In almost all electoral systems, parties and candidates have to meet basic require-
ments in order to be allowed to compete in the electoral race. All of these formal 
rules may hinder parties and politicians to step into the ring – be it due to a lack of 
resources or by virtue of psychological reasons (e.g., missing self-confidence or res-
ervation costs). Hence, ex-ante entry conditions limit the number of competitors 
and, as a result, shape the starting situation for competition (Bischoff, 2006; Elklit & 
Reynolds, 2002; Hug, 2001). Accordingly, we measure the ex-ante entry conditions 
with an additive index composed of seven items that capture the degree to which 
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 The countries and a part of the data base on the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann et al., 
2011; see www.democracybarometer.org). The 30 countries include Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States. 
6
 We conducted principal component analysis and set Eigenvalues > 1 as the condition for the 
creation of factors.  
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the access to an election is complicated.
7
 By adding up all of these indicators, we ob-




RE Q U I R E M E N T S  T O  PO L I T I C A L  RE T U R N   
Ex ante entry conditions are not the only barriers that previously or currently exist 
within the political process of legislative elections. After entering the electoral rally, 
political parties and competitors commonly face the problem of achieving political 
return, such as winning seats and, therewith, gaining political power and say. As in 
the case of the entry conditions, high requirements to political return could cause 
political contenders to stay away from the election (Bischoff, 2006; Hug, 2001; 
Tavits, 2006). Therefore, we operationalize the minimum requirements to political 
return with the vote share of the smallest party that is getting voted in.
9
 
NU M B E R  O F  P A R T I E S  R U N N I N G  F O R  E L E CT I O N S  
The most important effect of contestability is the prevention of collusion. When en-
try barriers are high, established parties collectively share political power without 
facing the risk of new competitors and there is a risk that these parties do not re-
spond to the electoral wishes any more. Normally, such a system is challenged by 
new parties that take into consideration the voter’s preferences. However, this is on-
ly realistic when barriers to entry allow for new competitors. The lower the entry 
barriers, the higher the incentives for new parties to challenge the established par-
ties. In open systems, new political preferences and interests are rapidly admitted to 
the political process (Macedo, 2005; Morlino, 2005). The effective number of elec-
toral parties, thus, can be seen a proxy for the openness of an electoral system. 
While parties are rational actors, they only compete when they have a chance to 
win. This chance is higher when entry barriers are lower. Hence, the more parties 
run for elections, the lower the entry barriers.
10
 We are aware of the danger of some 
sort of endogeneity that might occur by using a concept that is itself affected by the 
other variables within the same measure. However, as we are not examining a caus-
al chain within our contestability dimension, this is, at least here, not a relevant 
technical issue.    
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 These items are conditions for the registration of parties (compulsory; signatures; fees; other 
requirements) as well as for single candidates (signatures, fees; reimbursement); source: 
www.democracybarometer.org.  
8
 We used mean values for all 30 countries between 1995 and 2005. To measure contestabil-
ity, we multiplied the values with -1. Thus, low values indicate high hurdles.  
9
 Again, we used mean values between 1995 and 2005 and multiplied these means with -1 to 
indicate that low values are better for contestability.  
10
 We took the mean effective number of electoral parties between 1995 and 2005 as pro-
posed by Gallagher and Mitchell (2008). 
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T A B L E  1 :   F A C T O R  L O A D I N G S  C O N T E S T A B I L I T Y   
Variable Factor 1 
Low height of administrative hurdles 0.54 
Low share of smallest party voted in 0.71 
Effective number of electoral parties  0.75 
Eigenvalue 1.35 
Explained Variance 44.9% 
Principal Component Analysis; Eigenvalue > 1 
 
Using the factor loadings for each country (i.e., based on simple regressions), we ob-
tain the following picture. Remember, values below 0 indicate below average con-
testability, whereas values above 0 indicate high contestability (i.e., above average). 
Figure 1 shows differences in contestability within our country sample. Accordingly, 
the most open system can be found in Belgium whereas in Malta, contestability is 
lowest (i.e., the entry hurdles are highest) – with a remarkable gap to all other coun-
tries.  
F I G U R E  1 :   C O N T E S T A B I L I T Y  S C O R E S  B Y  C O U N T R Y   
  
Factor values by country  
ME AS URI N G AVAI L AB I LI TY  
Beside the entry conditions to the supply side of the political market, the demand 
side, such as the electorate and its behavior, is crucial to competition. A political sys-
tem where, in advance, the actors of the supply side (i.e., parties and politicians) rest 
assured that the composition and the configuration of the electorate is not going to 
change, lacks any incentive for parties and politicians to compete – the election re-
sult will not change either way.   
According to this and Bartolini’s considerations, changes of and characteristics with-
in the electorate make votes available and, therewith, induce a specific feature of 
political competition. There exists at least three basic components that, in this sense, 
characterize an electorate and the availability of votes: changes in size of the elec-
torate, the voter elasticity, and the voter sensitivity. All of these features shape the 
availability and should, consequently, be accounted for in measuring this dimension. 
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CH A N G E S  I N  T H E  S I Z E  O F  T H E  E L E C T O R A T E  
In the case of changes in the size of the electorate, one might first think about the in-
fluence of population growth and the demographic transition processes that are in-
volved in continually altering a country’s electorate. Although this would be an in-
teresting, up-to-date, and unexamined research question, we are not focusing on 
this kind of modification. Instead, we are interested in changes in the voter turnout 
with respect to the precedent legislative election and, therewith, in contractions and 
extensions of the basic electoral set. Accordingly, we measure this first concept with 
the change of voter turnout since the last election.  
However, the ways in which changes in the size of the electorate and competition 
are linked are unclear. Does an increase in the number of voters lead to more com-
petition between parties or does a contraction of the electorate intensify the contest 
as the voter becomes a rare commodity? We argue that, in this case, changes in 
both directions induce more competition and that moving away from status quo in 
either way requires the competitive action of parties and contenders. Therefore, we 




VO T E R  E L A S T I C I T Y   
Changes in the size of the electorate are not the only source for competitive action. 
Even without changes in the size and the composition of the electorate, there exists 
incentives to compete for votes since a certain part of the electorate is commonly 
known to be willing to change its party preferences. An often-used indicator for the 
societal willingness to switch party preferences is the electoral volatility. It indicates 
the net change within an electoral party system resulting from individual vote trans-
fers (Ascher & Tarrow, 1975). Systems with more swing voters and loose party-voter 
bonds tend, in this understanding, to be more competitive – parties need to offer 
more and operate proactively to maintain their vote share.
12
 
VO T E R  SE N S I T I V I T Y   
Voters’ elasticity is closely related to their sensitivity. An available voter is normally 
uninformed about the programs or performances of a party, but he must be sensi-
tive to such information. Such sensitivity is higher in countries with low segmenta-
tion and a low degree of political organization. Accordingly, in such countries, the 
probability of vote-switching is higher, and this induces political competition be-
tween electoral contenders. We thus operationalize the voter sensitivity with the 
percentage share of the voting age population that is neither a member in a labour 
union nor a professional organization: The higher the share of non-members in a so-
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 We used data from UCI’s University of California Election Turnout Database 
(http://www.democ.uci.edu/resources/archive.php). We took the mean of the absolute val-
ues of the elections between 1995 and 2005 (considering the election that took place before 
1995).   
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 We used basic data from the International-Parliamentary Union (IPU) database on national 
parliaments (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp) and from Parties and Elections 
in Europe (http://www.parties-and-elections.de) to calculate our own electoral volatility data.  
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T A B L E  2 :   F A C T O R  L O A D I N G S  A V A I L A B I L I T Y   
Variable Factor 1 
Absolute turnout change 0.82 
Electoral volatility 0.76 
Percentage share of non-members 0.67 
Eigenvalue 1.71 
Explained Variance 56.9% 
Principal Component Analysis; Eigenvalue > 1 
 
Again, we use the factor loadings for each country to show the differences between 
the countries. Availability is the highest in Hungary, whereas in Iceland, the demand 
side of competition is quite low.  
F I G U R E  2 :   A V A I L A B I L I T Y  S C O R E S  B Y  C O U N T R Y   
 
Factor values by country  
 
ME AS URI N G DECI D AB I L IT Y  
Bartolini argues that competition also depends on the offer. Parties must take a clear 
position that is distinctive from other parties. Furthermore, the party’s responsibility 
must be as visible as possible. Decidability, thus, is high when there are no possibili-
ties for parties to hide their responsibility (i.e., when there are no opportunities for 
party interaction and collusive behavior). Of course, an important precondition is 
that there is an opportunity to choose (Lipset, 1963). However, to be decidable, an 
electoral system should not give too much choice. We again suggest three variables 
to measure these features of decidability.   
Because competition processes are not isolated from party interactions in the par-
liamentary process, collusion is more probable in systems with many opportunities 
                                                                 
13
 We summed up the trade union density (according to the ILO) and the share of members in 
professional organizations (according to different world values surveys) and took the mean of 
the sums from different years between 1995 and 2005.  
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and incentives for party interactions. It becomes clear that there is only one case 
where such collusion does not take place: a two-party system.  
GO V E R N M E N T  TY P E   
The importance and the transparency of the offer first depend on the type of gov-
ernment (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). According to 
Downs (1957), a rational voter punishes or rewards the government party according 
to his/her evaluation of its performance. However, when there is a coalition in gov-
ernment, it becomes impossible to evaluate this performance. A voter cannot easily 
decide which party of the coalition is at fault for a given situation of bad economic 
growth. Further, he cannot determine which party should be rewarded for the low 
unemployment rate. Thus, decidability is highest in single-party governments, re-
gardless of whether it is a single party majority or a single party minority govern-
ment, and lowest in broad government coalitions.
14
  
GO V E R N M E N T  FR A CT I O N A L I Z A T I O N   
The same idea is measured with a similar indicator of government fractionalization. 
It measures the probability that two MPs who are picked at random from among the 
government parties will be of different parties. We argue again that a system is the 
more decidable when a government is less fractionalized. Thus, high decidability oc-




LO W  EF F E C T I V E  NU M B E R  O F  PA R L I A M E N T  PA R T I E S   
The probability of collusion between parties increases with the number of parties. 
Bartolini argues that collusion normally does not occur in a two-party system that 
consists of a governmental and an opposition party. The more parties in parliament, 
however, the higher the incentives to collaborate and the lower the visibility. It be-
comes very difficult for rational voters to ascribe responsibility for specific political 
decisions to one party only. In such a case, the voters have fewer possibilities to pun-
ish or reward a single party. Hence, the higher the effective number of parties in a 







                                                                 
14
 We refer to the government type-variable of Armingeon et al. (2010) and recoded a single-
party majority government (1) as well as a single-party minority government (5) as 1 and all 
multi-party types as 0 (a minimal winning coalition, surplus coalition, multi-party minority 
government). Finally, we took the mean of all recoded years (1995-2005). Thus, there can be 
values other than simply 0 and 1 in the different countries, depending whether there were 
changes in government formation (i.e., cabinet size).  
15
 We take the govfrac indicator from the DPI (Keefer, 2009) 
16
 We used the mean effective number of parliamentary parties between 1995 and 2005 from 
Gallagher and Mitchell (2008). 
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T A B L E  3 :   F A C T O R  L O A D I N G S  D E C I D A B I L I T Y   
Variable Factor 1 
Single-party government 0.88 
Government fractionalization 0.92 
Low effective number of parties in parliament 0.86 
Eigenvalue 2.35 
Explained Variance 78.3% 
Principal Component Analysis; Eigenvalue > 1 
 
According to the factor loadings for each country, decidability is the highest in Malta 
and lowest in Belgium.   
F I G U R E  3 :   D E C I D A B I L I T Y  S C O R E S  B Y  C O U N T R Y   
 
Factor values by country  
 
ME AS URI N G VUL NER ABI LI T Y  
Vulnerability corresponds to the uncertainty of the electoral outcome. It measures 
the most widely used concept of competition in US literature (Bishoff, 2006): the 
closeness of the race. To capture this dimension, we suggest three different 
measures of closeness: the closeness of election results, the degree of concentration 
of parliamentary seats, and the balance of power between government and opposi-
tion.  
VO T E  D I F F E R E N CE  
The most often-used measure for the closeness of the race is the difference in the 
obtained votes of the two strongest parties (Blais, 1996). The lower the safety of 
tenure, the smaller the difference between the two strongest parties is. When the 
incumbent party cannot be sure to gain the majority of the votes, it will be obliged 
to act in a responsive way (i.e., to do what all citizens want). Responsiveness further 
grows as a result of close races because, from a rational choice point of view, it also 
raises turnout: Close races foster the probability of the importance of a single vote. 
Thus, the closer the race, the higher the turnout (Blais, 2010; Franklin, 2004).
17
  
                                                                 
17
 We use the data from the Democracy Barometer (www.democracybarometer.org).  
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SE A T  D I F F E R E N CE  
Closeness is normally measured by the vote difference of the two strongest parties. 
However, this closeness can be measured differently. Depending on the electoral 
system, there can be a close race concerning the votes which parties obtain that is, 
nevertheless, not mirrored in the seat difference. Therefore, we further consider the 
seat difference between the two strongest parties.
18
 
BA L A N CE  O F  PO W E R S  
We further argue that closeness depends on the party system. In two-party systems 
with single-party governments, closeness indeed measures the vulnerability of the 
government. In multi-party systems with coalition governments, however, we should 
not only consider the difference between the two strongest parties, but also the bal-
ance between the government and opposition parties. When there is no chance to 
change the government coalition, vulnerability is low even when the two strongest 
parties in the government are very close with respect to the number of votes and 
seats. We base our balance-of-power indicator on Altman and Perez-Liñan (2002): 
The Balance of powers (opposition vs. government) as calculated by C = 1 – abs((G-
O)/100), where G = Σgi
2
 / Σgi; and O = Σoi
2
 / Σoi. gi and oi respectively stand for the 
seat shares of government and opposition parties. C equals 0 whenever the govern-
ment (or the opposition) controls the whole legislature and 1 if there is a full balance 




T A B L E  4 :   F A C T O R  L O A D I N G S  V U L N E R A B I L I T Y   
Variable Factor 1 
Vote difference 0.92 
Seat difference 0.98 
Balance of powers 0.95 
Eigenvalue 2.71 
Explained Variance 90.3% 
Principal Component Analysis; Eigenvalue > 1 
 
As for the other three dimensions, we use the factor loadings to depict the differ-
ences in vulnerability between our 30 countries. According to our measurement of 
the mean values between 1995 and 2005, vulnerability is the highest in Cyprus. Con-
trarily, in average, the electoral races are not at all close in South Africa.   
                                                                 
18
 We use the data from the Democracy Barometer (www.democracybarometer.org). 
19
 We use the data from the Democracy Barometer (www.democracybarometer.org). 
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F I G U R E  4 :   V U L N E R A B I L I T Y  S C O R E S  B Y  C O U N T R Y   
 
Factor values by country  
EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS  
With our four dimensions of competition at hand, we can test some of the assump-
tions that Bartolini makes concerning the relationship between them (Bartolini, 
2000: 55ff; section 1) and we can use them as features of different types of competi-
tion (section 2).  
MU TU AL  RE L AT I ONS HI P S OF  T HE  D IME NS IO NS  O F COM PE T IT I ON  
Bartolini argues that the four dimensions must not be seen as additive elements of 
one phenomenon. On the contrary, they can show even mutual constraining rela-
tionships. To illustrate this, Bartolini deduces three hypotheses:  
(1) He argues that high contestability allows high fragmentation because small and 
single-issue parties can easily bring their demands into the electoral arena and 
bypass more established parties. In closed systems, single issues must be articu-
lated and made palatable to more encompassing parties. Thus, Bartolini argues, 
fragmentation due to high contestability blurs the distinction between govern-
ment and opposition and, therefore, should have a negative effect on vulnera-
bility.  
(2) The second hypothesis depends on the party system. Bartolini argues that vul-
nerability is highest in a two party system with parties of equal size. However, in 
such a system, the two parties tend to compete for the median voter and hence 
are not willing to take clear and distinct positions. Thus, vulnerability has a po-
tential negative effect on decidability unless contestability allows for the entry 
of third parties. 
(3) A high degree of decidability is more probable when voters are, to some extent, 
volatile, which allows parties to take clear positions. In other words, parties 
have higher incentives to try to win elections by taking clear positions when 
they know that voters are not culturally bound to other parties. Too much avail-
ability, however, can negatively affect decidability: “a certain amount of vote 
identification and vote stability is necessary to allow parties to plan the offer” 
(Bartolini, 2000, p. 58).  
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T A B L E  5 :   C O R R E L A T I O N  M A T R I X :  B I V A R I A T E  C O R R E L A T I O N S  O F  T H E  4  
D I M E N S I O N S  ( P E A R S O N S ’  R )  
 Vulnerability Availability Contestability Decidability 
Vulnerability  -0.32 0.18 -0.37 
Availability -0.32  0.16 0.06 
Contestability 0.18 0.16  -0.67 
Decidability -0.37 0.06 -0.67  
 
Two out of the three hypotheses outlined above seems to be confirmed by this first 
cursory analysis: Vulnerability and decidability indeed correlate negatively (H2) and 
availability has no clear-cut effect on decidability (H3). However, the connection be-
tween contestability and vulnerability is not negative, but (weakly) positive (H1). 
Thus, the openness and potential fragmentation of the system seems not to impede 
close races.  
However, taking the argument seriously, there is no contestability in the sense of 
openness of the system that lowers vulnerability, but instead there is a fragmenta-
tion of the system (i.e., the number of parties). Bartolini argues that high contesta-
bility potentially enlarges the number of parties and that the sheer number of par-
ties negatively affects vulnerability. When we take the effective number of electoral 
parties only, we cannot find a negative correlation with our vulnerability dimension 
either. In other words, the closeness of the race is not dependent on few parties. We 
can even take a closer look at our sample by comparing the countries with an effec-
tive number of electoral parties below 3.5 (i.e., Australia, Austria, Portugal, Spain, 
the United Kingdom, United States, Malta, and South Africa) with the countries with 
a higher number of effective electoral parties. Taking the mean of both country 
groups, we find low mean values for contestability and vulnerability in the systems 
with few parties and high respective mean values within the sample of countries 
with a higher number of parties that want to be elected (table 6).  
 T A B L E  6 :   M E A N  V A L U E S  D E P E N D I N G  O N  P A R T Y  S Y S T E M  
Countries  Vulnerability Availability Contestability Decidability 
Number of ef-
fective electoral 
parties < 3.5 
1)
 
-0.40 -0.15 -0.96 1.00 
Number of ef-
fective electoral 
parties > 3.5 
2)
 
0.14 0.05 0.35 -0.36 
1) Australia, Austria, Portugal, Spain, UK, US, Malta, and South Africa 
2) Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germa-
ny, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland 
 
However, looking even more accurately on the countries with a low number of effec-
tive parties, we can at least partly explain why we do not find the suggested connec-
tion between decidability and vulnerability. In two out of these eight countries (i.e., 
the UK and South Africa), vulnerability is exceptionally low. In the other six countries, 
vulnerability has the suggested relatively high value. The low vulnerability in UK and 
South Africa, however, can be explained by the specific situations in both countries 
during the years that we investigate (1995-2005). In the UK, Labour was much 
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stronger than the conservative party. In South Africa, the ANC, after the abolishment 
of the apartheid regime, won the elections by a very clear margin.  
As for the remaining two hypotheses, bivariate analysis is not very appropriate. Ac-
cording to Bartolini, the connection between vulnerability and decidability is medi-
ated by contestability: the negative effect of vulnerability on decidability should be 
attenuated by growing contestability. We, therefore, tested interactions between 
the three dimensions. However, our model shows that vulnerability has a negative 
impact on decidability, but that this is mediated neither by contestability nor by the 
effective number of electoral parties.  
Again, we take a closer look at our sample. There are 14 countries that meet the as-
sumption of high vulnerability and low decidability (i.e., Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Slovenia, and Switzerland). In seven other countries (Australia, Costa Rica, Czech Re-
public, Malta, New Zealand, Spain, and the US), vulnerability and decidability are 
high. When we now look at the contestability of these countries, we indeed find a 
difference, but not in the assumed direction: the mean value for contestability is 
much lower in the second group (i.e., high values in vulnerability and decidability) 
than in the first group (i.e., high vulnerability and low contestability). In other words, 
high vulnerability has a slight negative effect on decidability, but this effect does not 
seem to be moderated by contestability.  
However, Bartolini argues that the interactive effect of contestability should be 
highest in systems with few parties. In such systems, the few parties are not willing 
to take clear positions because they are not forced to do so by additional parties that 
compete. Therefore, we look at the eight countries with a low number of effective 
electoral parties (see table 6). Austria is the only country with high vulnerability and 
low decidability. In Australia, Costa Rica, Malta, Spain, and the US, both dimensions 
show values above 0. In Portugal and South Africa, vulnerability is low and decidabil-
ity is high. In Austria, contestability is comparatively low (-1.01), and in Australia and 
Spain, it is highest within this country-group (-0.17 and -0.05). In these three coun-
tries, we can indeed observe the suggested effects. However, Malta and the US are 
cases where we simultaneously have high vulnerability and high decidability. Never-
theless, both systems are quite closed because they show comparatively low values 
of contestability (-3.66 in Malta and -0.84 in the US).  
Finally, we turn to hypothesis 3, the connection between availability and decidabil-
ity. Here Bartolini suggests a curvilinear effect. Decidability only takes place when 
there is a certain degree of availability. However, too much availability negatively af-
fects decidability because parties need some stability to plan their offer. Thus, we 
suggest low decidability in both countries with low availability as well as those with 
high availability. This effect can be modeled by the squared value of availability. Our 
linear regression model indeed shows a negative coefficient of this variable, indicat-
ing in fact an n-shaped curve. However, the coefficient lacks significance.  
Our country sample again allows for a more specific observation. We look at the five 
countries with the highest values for availability (e.g., Costa Rica, France, Hungary, 
Slovenia, and South Africa) and the five with the lowest values for availability (i.e., 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Malta). Based on the hypothesis, we would 
first suggest that these 10 countries all show low values in decidability. This is the 
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case for seven out of the ten countries, but not for Costa Rica, Malta, and South Afri-
ca. All three show comparatively high values for decidability. In Malta, the electoral 
demand is very stable and, nevertheless, the island country shows the highest value 
for decidability within the 30-country sample. On the contrary, availability in South 
Africa and Costa Rica is very high, as is decidability.   
In a nutshell, we must refuse the three hypotheses: There is neither a clear-cut con-
nection between the number of parties and vulnerability nor a systematic attenua-
tion of the negative effect of vulnerability on decidability by contestability. Further-
more, we cannot find any significant n-shaped curve relationship between availabil-
ity and decidability. However, looking more specifically on the different countries, 
we can at least create some indications for all three hypotheses. Thus – at least with 
our measures of the four dimensions – it seems that the idea of the multidimension-
ality of competition is rather a matter of typology than a matter of degree. This turns 
us to our second empirical part.  
TY PES  OF  COM PE TI T IO N  
The multidimensional approach of competition has at least two connecting conse-
quences. First, the four dimensions cannot simultaneously be maximized. However, 
this does not mean that competition is ineffective but that “competition inevitably 
rests on tough tradeoff between its own dimensions” (Bartolini, 2000, p. 59). Se-
cond, thus, the dimensions must be given different weights in the real world. Empiri-
cally, we therefore should have found different types of realized competition.   
To find such different types, we again follow Bartolini (2000, p. 60 f.) and distinguish 
three ideal type models of competitive democracies giving different importance to 
each dimension of competition: a “Downsonian model,” a “consociational competi-
tive interaction model,” and a “Schumpeterian model.”  
The least demanding model is the Schumpeterian one. For Schumpeter (1954), com-
petition is most essential for democracy. The distinctive characteristic of the political 
elite is its appetite for power. In democracies, different parties compete for this 
power in free, fair, and competitive elections. Competitive elections, according to 
Schumpeter, means that all existing elites have the possibility to fight for power and 
that the parties in power can easily be replaced. In terms of the four dimensions, 
contestability and vulnerability are most important for Schumpeter. However, the 
other two dimensions are irrelevant. Schumpeter argues that voters’ decisions are 
manufactured (i.e., the results of the campaign of the different parties). Thus, ac-
cording to this model, it does not matter at all whether competition is decidable or 
not and whether there is an effective demand in terms of availability.   
According to Bartolini, the Downsonian model of competition embraces high vulner-
ability, high availability, and low contestability. For this model, decidability is irrele-
vant. According to Downs (1957), parties take strategic positions to win parties. The-
se positions mirror the parties’ attempts to anticipate the voters’ preferences. In a 
two-party system, the model predicts a conversion of the parties’ programs towards 
a median voter because each party makes similar anticipations. It follows that the 
electoral race is very close; in theory, one median voter decides which party wins the 
election. Thus, vulnerability in a Downsonian competition model should be very 
high. However, this idea of competition depends on an electorate that is ready to 
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compare its preferences with the changing program of the parties. In other words, 
when there is no availability, parties cannot take strategic positions. Because parties 
should be free to change positions depending on the preferences of the citizens, de-
cidability is not needed. Finally, contestability should be low because this model only 
works when there are no new parties that can disturb the interplay between the es-
tablished parties.  
The third model lies on the opposite side of the Downsonian one. The consociational 
model aims at including all relevant interests into political decisions (Lijphart, 1999). 
The thread of the tyranny of majority (Tocqueville, 1997 [1835]) is met by power-
sharing among different interest groups, including minorities. However, such a mod-
el does not mean that there is no competition at all (Pujas & Rhodes, 1999). Of 
course, there is a high inter-party agreement, but in the consociational competitive 
interaction model, competition must foremost take place at the entry of the political 
arena. Once elected, parties should search for compromise instead of competition. 
This is another nice example proving that competition has different meanings and 
should be treated accordingly. In terms of our four dimensions, the consociational 
competitive interaction model gives much weight to contestability, whereas vulner-
ability and availability are reduced.   
To test whether we can find these models of competition in the real world, we re-
coded the factor scores of the four dimensions into dummies, whereas 1 indicates 
high values (above 0, or above average) and 0 indicates low values. Theoretically, 
there are 16 different possible combinations and types of competition (1111, 1110, 
etc.). In table 7, we filled in the 30 countries in our sample in the different possible 
cases.  
In 12 out of the 16 possible fields, we find empirical correspondence. Thus, there are 
more types of competition than the proposed three models that occupy 8 cases. This 
can be taken as a further sign of the complexity of the concept of ‘competition.’ As 
still discussed above, there are no clear-cut models of competition but the countries 
indeed give very different weights to the dimensions. The idea of the mutual inter-
connectedness of the four dimensions and of different forms and models of compe-
tition can be further highlighted by the fact that no country can maximize all four 
dimensions at the same time (the cell 1111 is empty) and every country has high 
values in at least one dimension (the cell 0000 is empty as well).  
Nevertheless, the three models prove to be quite good approaches. The majority of 
the 30 countries correspond to the three theoretical models: 13 countries have, 
simultaneously, time high values in vulnerability and in contestability. Therefore, 
they belong to the Schumpeterian model of competition. Two countries correspond 
to the Downsonian model and three countries are placed within the consociational 








































































































































































In brackets: type according to combination (vulnerability, availability, contestability, decidabil-
ity; 0 = low value; 1 = high value); highlighted cases correspond to the ideal type models: 
SCHUM = Schumpeterian model; DOWNS = Downsonian model; CONS = consocational com-
petitive interaction model. 
  
Looking at the Schumpeterian countries, namely those with open electoral systems 
(contestability) and comparatively close races (vulnerability), we can further distin-
guish according to availability and decidability. It is striking that all countries within 
this group have low values of decidability except one, New Zealand. Table 5 (correla-
tions) show a negative correlation between decidability and contestability: The 
openness of the electoral system increases the number of parties and, thus, seems 
to blur decidability. The exception of New Zealand can be explained by the recent 
electoral reform. New Zealand introduced PR in 1996. The number of parties as well 
as the success of small parties only slowly increased after this introduction. Thus, de-
cidability decreased over time, but the mean decidability that we capture is still 
slightly above 0 in New Zealand (0.09).  
There are two important differences concerning availability among the Schumpet-
erian countries. First, while in Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, and Slovenia, the 
mean membership in unions and professional organizations is high (62.3% as a mean 
of all these countries), it is low in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and 
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Cyprus (15.4%). The only exception with respect to membership is Switzerland. Se-
cond, the two country groups differ in the changes in turnout that are quite remark-
able in the group with high availability, whereas in the group with low availability, 
turnout remains relatively stable.  
Only two countries correspond to the Downsonian model: the Czech Republic and 
Costa Rica. Both countries show high vulnerability and high availability, but low con-
testability. Both are quite young democracies and show differences to the other 
countries in our sample foremost with respect to the rapidly decreasing turnout 
(from 84.7 to 57.9 in the Czech Republic and from 81.1 to 68.6 in Cost Rica between 
1995 and 2005) and with respect to significant changes in the party systems. From 
election to election, there are different numbers of parties as well as different com-
petitors. Thus, the comparatively high availability in these two countries seems to be 
primarily due to instable party systems and – perhaps also due to this instability – an 
increasing disillusion among the electorate. Both the decreasing turnout as well as 
the changing offer of different parties does not match the ideas of Downs, even if 
vulnerability rests high even under changing offers.  
In fact, we would expect four other countries to belong to the Dowsonian type. In-
deed, Australia, Malta, Spain, and the US – all remaining in the same type of compe-
tition – show high vulnerability and relatively closed systems (i.e., have low values 
concerning contestability). However, to fulfill the conditions for a Downsonian com-
petition model, they lack availability. Compared to other countries in our sample, 
the electorates in these four countries are not very volatile.  
Three countries fulfill the conditions of the consociational model, namely Sweden, 
Ireland, and Luxemburg. All three are – according to our data – considered as very 
open electoral systems (high values in contestability) while availability and vulnera-
bility are comparatively low. It is important to note that these countries are normally 
not considered as classical consensus countries in the sense of Lijphart (1999; see 
Vatter & Bernauer 2010, for new data). However, in terms of our ideal types of com-
petition, the low hurdles of entry and the strong and stable attachment of the elec-
torate as well as the clear electoral results of these countries are considered to be 
consensually competitive. Taking the example of Sweden, we must, however, relativ-
ism the notion of consensus. Even if the Swedish party system is very open, and vol-
atility as well as vulnerability is low, this is not due to large party coalitions that 
share power – as is the initial idea of consociational democracies suggests – but due 
to the strength of the socialist party in Sweden from 1945 until 2005. Of course, one 
could argue that the success of this party can also be taken a sign of high respon-
siveness (i.e., high inclusion of different preferences). Thus, low vulnerability, low 
availability, and high contestability must not necessarily lead to coalition govern-
ments but, nevertheless, can be considered as consensual in terms of our types of 
competition.   
Not only Australia, Malta, Spain, and the US, but also eight additional countries can-
not be assigned to one of our three theoretical type of competition: 
• In both countries, Austria as well as Germany, contestability, availability, and 
decidability is low, whereas vulnerability is high. In other words, both coun-
tries – at least on average and between 1995 and 2005 – show up to be 
closed systems where new parties cannot easily compete, in both countries 
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government often is formed by oversized coalitions and the electorate is ra-
ther strongly attached to the big parties. What makes these two countries 
competitive democracies is the fact that the two big parties have the same 
size in terms of vote strength (again: in average between 1995 and 2005) as 
well as a small third party that tip the scales. Whether the two countries al-
so belong to this ‘classic vulnerability type of competition’ over time would 
be an interesting question. In Austria as well as in Germany, the crusted 
party system was at least partly broken open by the third parties (FPÖ and 
FDP). However, both times, the success of these parties was only moderate. 
It will be interesting to see whether the ‘new’ success of the Green Party in 
Germany will change the type of competition in Germany.  
• Due to the party as well as to the electoral system, we would suggest UK to 
be a further classical Downsonian competition democracy. However, even if 
there is high availability and low contestability, our data indicates low vul-
nerability in the UK. This can at least partly be explained by the success of 
the Labour party during the time span of our analysis: Between 1995 and 
2005, the party of Tony Blair was much stronger than the Conservative par-
ty. Again, taking a more longitudinal perspective could provide interesting 
insights concerning the typology.    
• The remaining five countries all show low vulnerability. If one would take 
the closeness of the race as a classical concept of competition only, these 
five countries would not be seen as very competitive ones. However, taking 
competition as a multidimensional concept, we can show that competition 
takes very different forms (figure 5).   
There is not enough space here to explain the differences between these 
five countries. However, what the figure aims to show is the variance of 
very different patterns of competition. When we take the different values 
of the four dimensions and draw them on four different axes, we get cob-
webs that nicely illustrate the different patterns. The size as well as the 
shapes of the different forms of competitions differ considerably across the 
countries. While in all of these countries the closeness of the race is com-
paratively low, this does not mean that these countries cannot be consid-
ered as competitive democracies. On the contrary, the shapes indicate very 
different forms of conflict, negotiation, and cooperation among parties (i.e., 











Note: The axes of the cobwebs indicates the factor-scores of the different dimensions of com-
petition (vul = vulnerability; ava = availability; con = contestability; dec = decidability). For rea-
sons of comparability, all axes range from -4.5 (lowest factore score) to 3.0 (highest factor 
score).  
CONCLUSIONS  
The concept of political competition is widely used among political scientists and 
plays a crucial role in democratic political theory and empirical comparative politics. 
Despite or even because of its broad application, the concept seems to have re-
mained ‘elusive’ (Bischoff, 2006) and to be used in a ‘vague’ and ‘ambiguous’ man-
ner (Bartolini, 1999; 2000).  
In his seminal contribution, Bartolini sheds light on the distinctive nature of competi-
tion from three different angles. First, competition must be differentiated from con-
flict, negotiation, and cooperation. Even though all of these forms of social interac-
tion share some basic characteristics with at least one of the other three types, 
competition is unique in its consequences imposed on third parties because it trans-
forms individually driven interests into socially desirable ends. Second, desirability 
can only be the case if a framework of rules, norms, and regulations pre-exists. Ac-
cording to Bartolini, such surrounding conditions have to be installed prior to com-
petition, namely through cooperation and negotiation. Hence, democracy is a neces-
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sary condition of competition and not vice versa. Third, electoral competition is 
composed of – at least – four mutually interconnected dimensions: contestability, 
availability, decidability and vulnerability. 
Each of these dimensions covers a distinctive feature of political competition and, 
thus, needs – in pursuing a holistic approach – to be taken into consideration. The 
contestability and the decidability concepts catch two basic characteristics of the 
supply side of the electoral market. Whereas the contestability dimension covers the 
terms and conditions of the market entrance, the decidability side is concerned with 
the character and the distinctiveness of the political offer. In contrast, the availability 
dimension treats the demand side of the electoral market and investigates whether 
and to what extent demand exists. Last but not least, the vulnerability concept refers 
to what might be called uncertainty of outcome or closeness of the race.  
Starting from this firm theoretical and unique basement, we proposed different indi-
cators for each of the four dimensions. Basing on mean values of these indicators 
between 1995 and 2005 in 30 different established democracies and using confirma-
tory factor analyses, we are able to show that, in each dimension, the deduced nu-
merical characteristics all measure one underlying construct – probably Bartolini’s 
dimensions.  
With the measures at hand, we gave some first empirical insights, answering to the 
propositions Bartolini made in the reminder of his paper. According to our data, the 
four dimensions indeed are mutually interconnected. However, while there are biva-
riate correlations that partly confirm Bartolini’s suggestions, the connections be-
tween the four dimensions seem to be more complicated is it seems more promising 
to look at different patterns of competition. Our data indeed shows different models 
of competition. As suggested by Bartolini, the different countries give different 
weight to the different dimensions of competition. One can find countries that 
match well with theoretically deduced types of competitive democracies, and there 
are also countries with very unique patterns.  
All in all, the empirical results should only be seen as first cursory tests for the ap-
plicability of the idea of an empirical measurement of the multidimensionality of 
competition. At least our findings show that it is promising to adopt this idea for 
empirical analysis. There is no simple model and no simple measure of competition; 
rather there is a variety of different models of negotiation, collusion, or cooperation 
between parties.  
With this paper, we try to show the potential of treating competition as a multidi-
mensional concept, not only in theoretical but also in empirical terms. Of course, 
there are many objections: First, one could criticize our method. Our measures for 
the different dimensions depend on the indicators and the aggregation procedure. A 
second objection concerns the use of averaged values instead of measuring situa-
tional competition (i.e., different single competitions in the different countries). 
Third, we have to answer the ‘so what’ question. Does it really matter whether we 
use a one or a multidimensional measure of competition?  
We try to briefly respond to these objections. As for the methodological criticism, we 
tried different indicators and different methods, such as promax or oblimin rotated 
factor scores. All in all, the different connections between the four dimensions, as 
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well as the typology, remain quite stable. Second, we argue that the use of average 
values (over 11 years) better complains to the idea of different cultures of competi-
tion. Of course, the idea of multidimensionality and our data also allows for an anal-
ysis of single elections in the different countries.  
Third, not only does our data show different interesting patterns of competition be-
tween the countries, but first cursory analyses not presented here also show that 
the different types vary according to political outcome. Within the Downsonian type, 
turnout is lowest and corruption highest, but the mean issue congruence seems 
highest.
20
 Corruption is lowest in the Schumpeterian type and the highest mean 
turnout can be found in the countries belonging to the consociational model of 
competition. When we look at the whole sample and the different dimensions, we 
can give more fine-grained insights than hitherto analysis of competition. Turnout, 
for instance, decreases with increasing contestability. The lower the corruption, the 
higher the value for availability in a country. And decidability negatively affects the 
issue congruence.  
These first results can be taken a sign for the importance of the idea of the multidi-
mensionality of competition. Furthermore, our analysis shows that treating competi-
tion as a multidimensional concept has great potential for further research. Our con-
tribution can be seen a first attempt to empirically account for this idea. It should 
have become clearer that “one should not speak (…) of more or less competition, 
but rather of a different mix of contestability, availability, decidability and vulnerabil-
ity” (Bartolini, 2000, p. 60).  
 
                                                                 
20
 We took the mean turnout between 1995 and 2005 of the parliamentary elections from 
IPU, the Corruption-Perception Index of Transparency International, and the issue-congruence 
indicator from www.democracybarometer.org (i.e., the congruence between distribution of 
left/right positions among voters and distribution of left/right positions among members of 
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